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THE CONTEMPT POWER. By Ronald L. Goldfarb. New
York City: Columbia University Press. 1963. Pp. ix,
366. $7.50.
Although the contempt power is frequently discussed in terms of
its technical procedural and legal implications, its fundamental interest both to lawyers and laymen is that it has been the vehicle for
deciding a variety of dramatic and significant social problems. In
many cases these problems involve a conflict between one constitutional right and another and in some, a conflict between competing
economic interests. In any event, these conflicts bear heavily on any
consideration of the contempt power. As Mr. Goldfarb points out,
the contempt proceeding has been, at least until recent years, "the
testing ground for the power of the press with respect to its privilege of contemporaneous comment about courts and trials" (p. 7).'
Many issues involving the struggle of labor for economic equality
during the early part of the Twentieth Century were resolved in the
context of contempt proceedings for violation of injunctions.2 Congressional investigations into subversion and communism, involving
the clash between the constitutionally protected rights of free speech
and freedom from incrimination, on the one hand, and, on the other,
the Congressional Committee's expressed intent to protect the National Security, are familiar to today's lawyer and layman.' Perhaps
the most significant legal issue facing our courts today is the dramatic conflict between the constitutional right to jury trial and the
problem of upholding federal court orders in civil rights matters
(p. 8).' In this context, Mr. Goldfarb's book deserves close scrutiny.
Mr. Goldfarb states that: "The purpose of this book is to examine
the history, varieties, and implications of the power of contempt of
court and Congress and other governmental bodies, to describe its
birth, growth, and maturation, and its conflicts with American notions of constitutional law" (p. 9). He then traces the contempt
power to the early English rulers and the "divine law of kings, and
its aspects of obedience, cooperation, and respect toward government bodies" (p. 11). Originally, the king's courts and officers
1 See, e.g., Bridges v. California, and Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court of California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
2 See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
3 See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
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appropriated his power on the ground that they were acting in his
place. Gradually, the contempt power was considered to be one inherent in the courts themselves and eventually, courts held that it
was necessary to their judicial function (pp. 12-14). Mr. Goldfarb
argues that until the end of the Eighteenth Century, contempts,
except those "in the face of the court," were treated procedurally,
"in the ordinary course of the law" (pp. 15-16). Apparently, Mr.
Goldfarb means by "in the ordinary course of the law," the right to
jury trial, among other things (p. 18). "Contempts in the face of
the court" includes, apparently, physical disruption of the court's
proceedings, but it must also include frustration of the court's orders
out of its presence, since the Supreme Court, in the appendix to its
opinion in United States v. Barnett,5 cites numerous examples from
as early as the mid-Seventeenth Centtury where persons were punished by colonial courts without jury trial for contempt of court outside of the court's presence, including the contempt of speaking
critically of the courts and their decisions. Of course, as Mr. Justice
Goldberg pointed out in his dissent in the Barnettcase, the penalties
authorized 'and imposed for criminal contempts during colonial
times and at the time of the adoption of the American Constitution
were generally minor and the courts were generally permitted by
law to impose minor criminal penalties without a trial by jury for a
variety of trivial offenses, "including, but not limited to, criminal
contempts." Whether or not Mr. Goldfarb is right in his conclusion
that the court's power to deal summarily with contempts committed
outside its presence is an invention of Justice Wilmot in Rex v.
Almon' (p. 16), or whether the Almon case is merely a more celebrated example of the court's tendency to punish criticism of itself,
this is not the answer to the question whether a person accused of
committing a criminal contempt of a court outside its immediate
presence is or is not entitled to a jury trial and the other constitutional safeguards extended to criminal defendants. Mr. Goldfarb
argues along with Mr. Justice Black' that the constitutional right to
a jury trial should extend to a criminal contempt committed outside
the courtroom (pp. 183-84), and he predicted, in an appendix to
his book (pp. 333-34), that the Supreme Court would adopt this
view in its decision in the Barnett case. In that case, contrary to Mr.
Goldfarb's prediction, the court reached the opposite conclusion;
but in a puzzling footnote states, by way of dictum: "Some members
of the Court are of the view that, without regard to the seriousness
a Ibid.
a Id. at 740.
The -opinion in Rex v. Almon was written in 1765, but was not published until
1802 when Justice Wilmot's son included it in WILmoT's NoTazs (Wilmot ed.).
s Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193-94 (1958) (dissent).
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of the offense, punishment by summary trial without a jury would
be constitutionally limited to that penalty provided for petty offenses."9 Because of this footnote, Mr. Goldfarb's prediction may
have been only partly wrong.
In any event, the right to a jury trial in criminal contempt cases
has been extended by statute to a broad category of contempts of
court,"0 and summary proceedings in contempts committed in the
court's presence have been limited by judicial interpretation.1"
Of course, Mr. Goldfarb does not confine himself to a discussion
of criminal contempts. He also discusses the civil contempt at length
(pp. 46-67). One of the most useful purposes which Mr. Goldfarb's
book will serve for the lawyer is as an exposition of the incredible
bootstrapping which is involved in the categorization of contempts
as Civil as opposed to Criminal.
. . . For example, since the method of reviewing contempt cases is
determined by the classification of the contempt (civil contempt
was reviewed by a direct appeal, and criminal contempt by a writ
of error), it is circuitous to use this aspect of the proceeding at a
later stage to reflect upon the proper classification of that same
contempt (p. 63).
One must note that these classifications are signally important.
With each labeling of a given contempt, a different door is opened
to a different legal arena and a new association of participating
procedures and characteristics. These classifications go to the heart
of an accused contemnor's liberty and property rights... (p. 48).
• . . For example, direct contempts are dealt with summarily, indirect contempts demand some hearing; direct contempts are insignificantly protected by the First Amendment, constructive contempts
usually are protected; criminal contempts are pardonable, civil
contempts are not; civil contempts allow for punishment which
could conceivably continue without end, while criminal contemppts
have vaguely limited punishments; the privilege against self-incrimination and the criminal Statute of Limitations apply to criminal but not civil contempts; the burden of proving the offense is
greater for criminal than for civil contempts; the civil contempt
sentence can be purged while an adjudication of criminal contempt
is fixed and final. The variations on this theme go on and on.
These are but a few of the more glaring examples, which underscore the perceptive Holmesian comment that the substance of the
law is secreted in the interstices of procedure (pp. 48-49).
The problems of classification become even more intolerable when
a litigant is faced with a combined criminal and civil contempt pro9 376 U.S. at 695 n.12.
10 See, e.g., 38 STAr. 738-740, 18 U.S.C. §§ 402 and 3691, and Rule 42(b)
F.R.CR.P.
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ceeding as in Penfield Company of California v. Securities & Exchange Commission.2
Although Mr. Goldfarb points out that the concept of contempt,
particularly the use of the contempt power to coerce compliance
with judicial decrees in civil matters, is not known in Civil Law
Countries (p. 2), he does not adequately discuss the procedures
which are used in Civil Law Countries as devices for obtaining compliance.
Mr. Goldfarb argues that originally "the contempt power was
directed at offensive conduct which derived its criminality from the
active interference with the crown or its acting official agents," and
that "what is now called civil contempt was originally called contempt in procedure and was considered a quasi-contempt; contempt
in theory and name alone" (p. 50). In effect, civil contempt is
merely an appropriation of the use of fines and imprisonment by
a court to compel obedience to a civil judgment of the court. The
author argues that civil contempt is retributive and that it violates
basic principles of criminal law and justice which have long been
accepted in the American sense of values in that it deprives the
individual of the right to trial by jury precedent to his imprisonment, it allows indefinite imprisonment for an undefined offense,
and it allows imprisonment in a civil matter (pp. 293-94). Further,
he concludes that it is unnecessary in most cases, since the aim could
be accomplished by other available methods short of imprisonment.
By way of example, he points out the typical case of a civil contempt where the husband fails to deliver property to the wife in
accordance with a decree of a divorce court. He states that powers
of execution such as garnishment, levy and attachment should be
perfected so that the true aim of the court's order, i.e., the payment,
can be accomplished. He states: "Only when the recalcitrant witness goes so far as to make normal execution by the court impossible should personal action against him be taken, and then it would
be for a true contempt of court, a criminal interference with government. After trial for this offense, the contemnor could be imprisoned for a definite period" (p. 296). He also states that "where
insufficient powers of execution exist, the legislature should provide
adequate machinery" (p. 296). Mr. Goldfarb's conclusions with
respect to civil contempt, particularly his comment that indefinite
imprisonment is really retribution no matter what the courts say
about carrying the keys to one's freedom (p. 61), make a great deal
of sense and it does seem questionable that an individual should be
12

330 U.S. 585 (1947).
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held in custody or subjected to confiscatory fines in civil matters.
Of course, if it is conceded that the imprisonment or fine is in fact
a penalty exacted for interference with government, then the true
nature of the proceeding becomes apparent and it is proper to ask
whether unlimited punishments and penalties for criminal acts are
proper in this country.
Congress early in its history successfully claimed that it had an
implied power to punish summary contempts1 In 1857, a congressional contempt statute was adopted for the prosecution of contempts in courts of law.1" Congress has not used the implied power
recently (p. 43) and the principal issues which have involved the
use of the contempt power by Congress have been those of balancing
the rights of free speech and association against the congressional
desire for information. Mr. Goldfarb's concern about the use of contempt as a device to determine these issues is twofold: (i) he claims
the contempt procedure is most frequently used as a device to expose
and that this is not really related to Congress' legislative function,
and (ii) that it is a device to punish by exposure those who have
engaged in behavior which if not criminal, is at least unpopular

(p. 288). He states:
Ours has traditionally been a government of cooperation between
Congress and the people. The ordinary representative or senator
who seeks legitimate information directly relevant to his legislative
work can usually get it without force. Most often, he need only ask
to be given zealous, popular assistance. Even in the two areas of
greatest conflict, crime and subversion, there is reason to conclude
that Congress might have done all it did (possibly more) without
the contempt sanction. Most people simply cooperate... (pp.
288-89).
He argues that it is not necessary to consider the congressional
investigative power and the congressional contempt power as one
issue. Without reaching a definite conclusion that the congressional
contempt power should be abolished, he indicates that he favors
this result (p. 290).
With respect to the judicial power of contempt Mr. Goldfarb
argues that courts could be protected from direct contempts by the
power to exclude recalcitrant persons from the courtroom, (no mention is made of the recalcitrant defendant in a criminal case), and
to cause disciplinary proceedings to be held with respect to misbe1s
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Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
11 STAT. 155-56 (1857), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
Under this statute, Congress may refer the matter to a United States Attorney who
presents it to a grand jury. If the grand jury returns an indictment, the case is
tried in a Federal district court by ordinary criminal processes.
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havior of counsel or other court officers rather than by the summary
power to punish (pp. 298-99).
Mr. Goldfarb concludes that he cannot expect either the courts
or Congress to adopt these suggestions so, instead, he suggests the
abolition of all civil contempts and all implied and statutory criminal contempts and the adoption of the following statute to replace
criminal contempt. The statute defines an offense he calls "misdemeanor to government" (p. 301):
Any person, whether as an individual or in a representative capacity, who willfully does an act or omits to act, in such a way as to
substantially obstruct a governmental agency's legitimate work,
without a legal right to so act or omit to act, is subject to a fine of
from $100 to $5,000, and imprisonment of from one day to one
year, or by
both.
the actlaw
proscribed
by this States,
section the
is also
prooffender
of the United
hibited
any Where
other penal
may be punished under either statute at the election of the United
States, but never may be prosecuted under both that statute and this
statute. Action under this law must be initiated by the complaint
of thep roper and authorized representative of the government
body offwnded. In any action under this section, all rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution will be guaranteed for the
benefit of the accused. Acts under this statute shall be confined to
personal conduct which affects official governmental proceedings,
and matters of attendance, cooperation, and obedience at those
proceedings (p. 302).
The purpose of the statute is to avoid many of the criticsms leveled by Mr. Goldfarb at the contempt procedure, including the
"generality . . . of contempt law . . . which leaves undefined to
poential wrongdoers bot the acts which are forbidden and the punishment which may be exacted for their commission.. ." (p. 300)
and the "denial of general rights of criminal procedure . . . (p.
301). Although the author has made a very plausible cause for
eliminating or substantially modifying the contempt procedure, his
"misdemeanor to government" statute as set forth above does not
come off well. He does not explain what the phrase "without a legal
right to so act or omit to act" means other than to refer to constitutional or "other legally recognized rights" and gives as an example
the exencise of the privilege against self-incrimination by refusing
to testify (p. 303). It would have been more illuminating had he
given an example other than constitutional since a constitutionai
right scarcely needs statutory recognition and it is difficult to envision
others except those which might be expressly provided by other
statutes. Perhaps the phrase is not intended to mean anything more,
but the reader cannot be sure and presumably neither could a court
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nor a witness pondering whether it included such things as the
"right to privacy" (p. 219). 15
The more serious defect in Mr. Goldfarb's statute is the word

"substantially." He is drafting a criminal statute and "substantially"

is hardly specific enough. What Mr. Goldfarb says he means, by
way of example, is that a person cannot be convicted for willfully
refusing to answer a congressional question even if there was a right
to ask and get an answer, since it may be that Congress could get
the answer from some other source (p. 303). If so, it is merely
another vehicle for a court to review the pertinency of congressional
investigation, a subject which would still be a legitimate source of
judicial inquiry. Mr. Goldfarb does not explain what happens if a
court charges a witness with violating this statute by refusing to
answer a question and is met with the defense that the litigant asking the question could obtain, or perhaps already has obtained in
judicially admissible form, the same evidence. The answer is that
neither Congress nor the courts will permit this kind of re-examination of the relevancy and value of information they desire to obtain.
Moreover, it is possible that the concept of obstruction of the
governmental agency's legitimate work would extend to executive
functions; a prospect which neither Mr. Goldfarb nor most citizens
would relish and which, in fairness to Mr. Goldfarb, he recognizes
may exist in the statute as set forth above (p. 305).
Mr. Goldfarb's recommendation would be more helpful had he
further explained and expanded it. He does state that he will leave
the "exact articulation . . .to others more skilled at the art [of
legislative draftsmanship]" (p. 308). It is probable that Mr. Goldfarb did work hard at articulating his statute and found it a very
hard subject to deal with definitively. It is equally probable that
Congress will not enact any such statute unless Mr. Goldfarb and
a great many others spend more time and effort on the subject; even
then it is unlikely.
Russell L. Johnson*

See Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HA.
* Member of the State Bar of California.
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